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Montana Law Review
VOLUME V.

SPRING, 1944

Mortgages
Judicial History and Present Status of
Section 8267, Montana Statutes
LEIF ERICKSON*

When Shylock demanded his pound of flesh he was foreclosing his mortgage. He was taking the pound of flesh which
had been pledged by Antonio as security for his debt. As barbarous a thing as that transaction was, yet it actually was
following the ordinary business practice that has been in existence since the time when man first wanted something but did
not have the wherewithal with which to pay for it.
All sorts of property have been used as security by borrowers, some of them even pledging their wives! The borrowing of money and the giving of security is so much a part of
human activity that it is doubtless but that every individual
at some time during his life becomes an active participant in
such a transaction.
In the early days in England, the borrower duly 'transferred possession of the security, this being known as a gage
or pledge. If the lender was to repay himself out of the rents
or profits of the security, the agreement was known as a vivum
vadium or living gage. But if the rents or profits were to be
retained by the lender without any reduction of the obligation,
the agreement was called a mortuum vadium or dead gage and
hence, mortgage.
Land has always been a popular subject of mortgagesundoubtedly due to its availability and stability. Early day
notions of seisin and estates made real estate mortgages quite
complex, and so along about the time Columbus discovered
America, we find Littleton' reducing the mortgage to a form
*Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.
'Coke upon Littleton (1853), Sec. 205a, is as follows:
"If a feoffment be made upon such condition that if the feoffor pay to the feoffee at a certain day, etc. 40 pounds of money,
that then the feoffor may re-enter, etc. in this case the feoffee is
called a tenant in mortgage . . . and if he doth not pay, then the
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understandable to the attorneys of that period. It was a conveyance in fee simple and is doubtless the forerunner of the
modern title theory.
In America, however, the prevailing view is that a mortgage
passes*no title, but that it creates a lien. As a result of this
position, the lien and the debt are thought of separately and
may be independent of each other in the matter of expiration.
As we shall see later, many states have special statutes on the
subject of the duration of the lien of a mortgage.
The law in Montana with relation to the duration of the
lien of a mortgage upon real estate is much confused as a
result of different interpretations placed upon Section 8267,
the statute in point. This article will attempt to present the
problem which the legislature was seeking to correct, and to
trace and comment upon the various constructions of the
statute since its enactment in 1913'a and its amendment in 1933.'
At the common law the lien of a mortgage was not extinguished by the lapse of the period within which an action to
enforce payment of the debt could have been maintained. However, the Montana legislature saw fit to change this in 1895,
when Section 8243, Revised Codes, was enacted, the provision
being that the lien is extinguished by the lapse of time which
makes the principal obligation unenforceable.
Under this state of the law, therefore, the mortgage would
continue to live only so long as did the principal obligation.
However the mortgage, if not cancelled would remain a cloud
on the title of the property mortgaged, and extrinsic evidence
would thus be required to disclose payment of the debt and extinguishment of the mortgage lien. With such a situation existing, it would be necessary in many cases for one interested in
the property or in acquiring an interest therein, to rely on
what facts he might be able to secure from the parties to the
instrument in order to determine whether the mortgage as
shown by the record was still of any effect. In other words, by
1913 real estate records were "chuck-full" of stale mortgages.
It was in view of this that Section 8267 was enacted, providing as follows:
"Every mortgage of real property made, acknowledged
and recorded, as provided by the laws of this State, is
land which is put In pledge upon condition for the payment of the
money is taken from him forever, and so dead to him upon condition, etc. And if he doth pay the money, then the pledge is dead
as to the tenant, etc."
'a Chapter 27, Session Laws of 1913.
'Chapter 104, Session Laws of 1933.
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thereupon good and valid as against the creditors of the
mortgagor or owner of the land mortgaged, or subsequent
purchasers or incumbrancers, from the time it is so recorded
until eight years after the maturity of the entire debt or
obligation secured thereby and no longer, unless the mortgagee, his heirs, executors, administrators, representatives,
successors, or assigns, shall within sixty days after the expiration of said eight years file in the office of the County
Clerk and Recorder where said mortgage is recorded, an
affidavit, setting forth the date of said mortgage, when and
where recorded, the amount of the debt secured thereby,
and the amount remaining unpaid, and that the said mortgage is not renewed for the purpose of hindering, delaying
or defrauding creditors of the mortgagor or owner of the
land, and upon the filing of said affidavit, the said mortgage shall be valid against all persons for a further period
of eight years."
Other statutes in force at that time were Section 9029,
enacted in 1889, providing that an action upon any contract,
obligation, or liability, founded upon an instrument in writing,
must be commenced within eight years, and Section 8264,
enacted in 1895, providing that a mortgage of real property
can be created, renewed, or extended, only by writing, with
the formalities required in the case of a grant of real property.
In 1933 the Legislature, for reasons satisfactory to itself,
amended Section 8267 by striking out the words "as against
the creditors of the mortgagor or owner of the land mortgaged,
or subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers," and substituted
for them the words, "as against all."
Attention will be paid to the questions of whether Section
8267 is a statute of limitations or is a recording statute, against
whom it is applicable, by whom it may be invoked, and whether
it is an exclusive method of extending a mortgage. All of these
matters have been passed upon by the court. With this background let us see what the court has held and said on the occasions when the statute has been before it.
The statute was first before the court in 1916 in the
case of Berkin v. Healy.! In that case the lien of mortgage
had expired before the enactment of the statute and it was
held that Section 8267 did not enable a mortgagee in such circumstances to revitalize his security by complying with its
terms and that such a law would be unconstitutional under the
14th amendment.
'52 Mont. 398, 158 P. 1020.
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The first time the meaning of the statute was inquired
into was in 1924 in Morrison v. Farmers' & Traders' State
Bank.' It was held that Section 8267 is not a recording statute,
affecting notice, but is a statute of limitations, affecting the
remedy, the effect of which is that a mortgage, in the absence
of the renewal affidavit, ceases to be of binding force as against
the persons mentioned and becomes unenforceable by the lapse
of eight years from the maturity of the debt or obligation
secured. It was further held that the statute, construed as
above, was not open to any attack on constitutional grounds.
In the same year, in the case of First National Bank of
Missoula v. Marlowe,' it was held that Section 8267 could have
no application in any case in which the record is silent as to
when the debt matured.
In 1927, Corwin v. Brainard, held that after a mortgagee
had complied with Section 8267 and extended the life of his
mortgage, he might foreclose at his pleasure. It was further
said that Section 8267 refers only to the extension of the lien
of mortgage and that as between the mortgagor and mortgagee
the mortgage is good so long as the debt be kept alive.
The
court also held that Section 8267 is not an exclusive method of
extending a mortgage but that the same could be accomplished
under the authority of Section 8264 with the formalities required in a grant of real property.
In Vitt v. Rogers," also in 1927, the court held that under
Section 8267, the life of a mortgage could only be extended by
the mortgagee, since the legislature's purpose was to limit
the life of a mortgage unless it was extended.
In 1928, Pereirav. Wulf' held that where a mortgagee fails
to file the renewal affidavit as required by Section 8267, the
land is freed from the burden of the mortgage debt. Foreclosure by the mortgagee was resisted by a subsequent purchaser of the land and there was no issue of notice raised.
Skillen v. Harris (1929)' substantiates the Pereiraand Corwin
cases. In Turner v. Powell (1929)" the words "subsequent
purchasers" in Section 8267 were construed and it was held
that the term as therein used did not embrace one who takes
property while the lien is yet subsisting and who expressly
takes the property subject to the mortgage.
'70
'71
'80
'81
'83
985
1085

Mont.
Mont.
Mont.
Mont.
Mont.
Mont.
Mont.

146, 225 P. 123.
461, 230 P. 374.
318, 260 P. 706.
120, 262 P. 164.
343, 272 P. 532.
73,
241, 277
278 P.P. 803.
512.
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In 1931 the statute was given a new twist in the case of
Hastings v. Wise.' In that case a debt had been extended for
ten years prior to maturity but no recording was made until
after maturity. A purchaser of the land contended that Section
8267 could be invoked to bar the mortgage but the court held
otherwise, basing its decision on the fact that there had been
actual notice. In the same year, Jones v. Hall' held that Section
8267 affects only the lien of the mortgage; that it does not
extend the life nor affect the debt which the mortgage is given
to secure.
In 1932 the Hastings case, supra, was again before the
court, an issue being whether Section 8267 was an exclusive
method of extending a mortgage and it was held not, in view
of Section 8264, citing the Corwin and Vitt cases.
Reed v. Richardson," decided in 1933, was a case in which
a plaintiff who held a first mortgage sought to foreclose against
a defendant who held under a quitclaim deed from the purchaser on the foreclosure of a second mortgage. Defendant
urged that plaintiff had failed to comply with the provisions
of Section 8267, but did not plead the general statute of limitations. It was held that in order to bar the debt the general
statute should have been pleaded, overruling the Morrison
case (supra). It was further held, (1) that Section 8267 did
not apply as between the parties, citing Corwin v. Brainard
and Skillen v. Harris and (2) that defendant was not a "subsequent purchaser" within the meaning of Section 8267, citing
Turner v. Powell. Here the defendant did not take the property
subject to the mortgage so that the court is holding that the
only persons who could be subsequent purchasers within the
meaning of the statute are those who became such after the
statutory period had elapsed. In application this would make it
difficult to interest a third party in mortgaged property since
he never could be sure" that some fact not of record such as
non-residence, or part payment, hadn't tolled the statute.
Since the Reed case had been commenced before the passage of the 1933 amendment, the court had no opportunity to
apply, it, but obviously felt that under the amended statute, a
different result might be reached, for the court said:
"It is pertinent to observe that at the recent session
of the legislative assembly the section was amended
(Senate Bill No. 199, Chapter 104, Laws of 1933). Many of
u89 Mont. 325, 297 P. 482.
"90 Mont. 69, 300 P. 232.
"94 Mont. 34, 20 P. (2d) 1054.
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the points involved in this case and in other cases mentioned will not be troublesome in the future."
14
In the same year .Leffek v. Luedeman
held that the administrator of an insolvent estate may assert the invalidity of
a mortgage because of noncompliance with Section 8267, the
reason being that the administrator mainly represents the
creditors, and only technically represents the deceased so that
this case does not do violence to the rule that Section 8267 does
not apply as between the parties.
First National Bank of Whitefish v. Gutensohn' was a 1934
case in which the bank held a mortgage dated 1922 to secure
a note. The note was renewed in 1924 and 1926 but the mortgage was never renewed. Within the eight year period defendant took a mortgage to secure a note in satisfaction of a
judgment against mortgagor and contended in answer to an
action by the bank, after the eight year period, to foreclose its
mortgage, that his was superior by virtue of Section 8267. The
court held for the bank since the administrator acquired his
mortgage while that of the bank was valid and subsisting and
was in no position to assert its invalidity, citing Turner v.
Powell and Reed v. Richardson, supra.
In 1935 the statute was four times before the court in the
cases of Register Life Ins. Co. v. Kenniston," Hillsdale College
v. Thompson," Humbird v. Arnet,' and Frisbee v. Coburn."
In the first a mortgage was extended under Section 8264 and
it was contended that an extension under Section 8264 could
not operate to renew the mortgage for a period longer than
as provided in Section 8267. However it was held that while
the two sections are in pari materia, one is not incorporated into
the other. Under this holding, a mortgage could be extended
under Section 8264 for any length of time that the parties see
fit and would remain valid so long as the debt was kept alive.
However, while apparently limitless, the holding is tempered
by the fact that no mortgagee would agree to an unusually long
extension unless of course he was holding the mortgage solely
for income purposes. The Hillsdale Collegq case was one where

Mont. 457, 27 P. (2d) 511, 91 A. L. R.286. See also Missoula Trust
& Savings Bank v. Boos, 106 Mont. 294, 77 P. (2d) 385, in which the
doctrine of the Leffek case was extended, the court now holding that
an administrator must set up Section 8267, and that failure to do so
would be constructively fraudulent against the creditors.
"97 Mont.
37 P. (2d) 555, 97 A. L. R. 731.
1699 Mont. 453,
191, 43 P. (2d) 251.
1"99 Mont. 400, 44 P. (2d) 753.
u99 Mont. 499, 44 P. (2d) 756.
"101 Mont. 58, 52 P. (2d) 882.
1495
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the defendant bought the mortgagor's interest before the expiration of the eight year period and contended he was the
owner of the property free and clear of the mortgage after the
expiration of the period. The court held that his rights were
subject to the mortgage, citing Turner v. Powell and Reed v.
Richardson. It was further held that although defendant was
a creditor before he bought the mortgagor 's interest, his status
in regard to the property was that of a purchaser.
The Humbird case held that where mortgaged realty was
acquired within the eight year period, the transferee could not
invoke Section 8267 until after the debt is barred under the
general statute of limitations, Section 9029. The last case,
Frisbee v. Coburn, holds in regard to Section 8267 that an allegation negativing the filing of the renewal affidavit is a
necessary part of a pleading seeking to rely on the statute.
Breese v. O'Brien," a 1936 case, held that as between
mortgagor and mortgagee and those acquiring title through the
mortgagee, the filing of a renewal affidavit is not necessary so
long as the obligation secured by the mortgage is kept alive,
citing Leffek v. Luedeman, supra. In the same year the court
reaffirmed its previous holding that as between the mortgagor
and mortgagee, the mortgage is not barred so long as the debt
is kept alive.!'
Rieckhoff v. Woodhull (1937)" holds that regardless of
what is done about renewal, a mortgage cannot exist longer
than the debt it is given to secure.
Aitken v. Lane," a 1939 case, was a case in which land was
quitelaimed more than eight years after the maturity of the
mortgage note. There was an extension which had been made
in pursuance of Section 8264 but which had not been recorded.
The holder of the quitclaim deed contended that he could rely
on the record and set up Section 8267. It was so held. In Siuru
v. Sell," decided the same year, it was held that a declaration
of homestead was effective against a levy of execution under a
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage which had not been renewed within the statutory period where the declaration of
homestead was made before entry of judgment.
In 1941, the case of Swingley v. Riechoff' held that the
mortgagor could not have his title quieted against a mortgagee
m102 Mont. 547, 59 P. (2d)
"Sommer v. Wigen (1936)
0106 Mont. 22, 75 P. (2d)
'108 Mont. 368, 92 P. (2d)
"108 Mont. 438, 91 P. (2d)
"112 Mont. 59, 112 P. (2d)

65.
103 Mont. 327, 62 P. (2d) 333.
56.
628.
411, 123 A. L. R. 423.
1075.
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who had allowed the statutory period to expire without renewing the mortgage unless such mortgagor first reimbursed the
mortgagee for the amount of the taxes paid by him to prevent
loss of title to the county. The court based its decision on the
theory that the mortgagee became subrogated to the county's
tax lien, but without the right to impose any penalty for delinquency.
The last construction of the statute is in Western Holding
Co. v Northwestern Land & Loan Co.' The mortgagors, after
giving a mortgage in 1917, conveyed to a loan company in
1924, subject to the mortgage. In 1928 the loan company conveyed to another who reconveyed to the loan company in 1933.
Both of these conveyances contained a recital that they were
subject to the mortgage. A renewal under Section 8267 was
filed in 1931, some fourteen years after the original mortgage.
The action was commenced in 1935 by the mortgagee, praying
for foreclosure. The loan company contended that the renewal
had been too late and that the mortgage was barred. The court
held that a conveyance subject to the mortgage, thereby extended the mortgage so that in this case it would not expire
until 1941, as the last conveyance was in 1933. The court did
not pass on the 1933 amendment to the statute except to say
that it would be unconstitutional if the legislature intended to
deprive a mortgagee of his right to foreclose without giving him
a reasonable time to commence suit.
Early in its life, then, the statute was believed by the court
to be one of limitation and applicable even as between the
parties. Then by later decisions it excluded the parties from the
terms of the statute, and went on to reach the result that Section 8267 could not apply in any case where the parties dealt
with the property on the basis of an existing mortgage and
finally said flatly that it was a recording statute.
Keeping this in mind, let us see how this problem has been
treated in other states. Some have done nothing so that the
common law rule that a mortgage lien may be enforced after
the expiration of the debt would be applicable." Others have
provided that the mortgage expires with the debt." These
states, therefore, take the position, with respect to this problem,
of Montana in the period from 1895 to 1913.
Several jurisdictions have statutes relating to the duration
of the lien of a mortgage but the wording of none is similar to
(1941) 113 Mont. 24, 120 P. (2d) 557.

"See 37 C. J., Limitations of Actions, p. 703, §23, for a discussion and
a citation of cases.
f37 C. J., Limitations of Actions, p. 704, §24.
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ours." These statutes fall into two classes, the one providing
that the mortgage shall have no effect whatsoever after the
period prescribed in the statute, and the other providing that
the constructive notice given by recording shall be limited to
the period prescribed in the statute. The former is usually re"The Minnesota statute, enacted in 1909 is as follows: "No action or
proceeding to foreclose a real estate mortgage, whether by action or
advertisement, or otherwise, shall be maintained unless commenced
within fifteen years from the maturity of the whole of the debt secured
by said mortgage, and this limitation shall not be extended by the
non-residence of any plaintiff or defendant or any party interested in
the land upon which said mortgage is a lien in any action commenced
to foreclose such mortgage, nor by reason of any payment made after
such maturity, nor by reason of any extension of the time of payment
of said mortgage or the debt or obligation thereby secured or any portion thereof, unless such extension shall be in writing and shall have
been recorded in the same office in which the original mortgage is
recorded, within the limitation period herein provided, or prior to the
expiration of any previously recorded extension of such mortgage or
debt, nor by reason of any disability of any party interested In such
mortgage."

(MINN. STAT. [Mason, 1927] 9188.)

This statute is used as a pattern by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for Section 12 of the UNIFoRM REAL ESTATE MoaRTGAGE ACT which is as follows: "(1) At the expiration of a period of

fifteen years from the last definite date of maturity of the debt or
other obligation secured by a mortgage as stated therein, or in an extension thereof duly executed and recorded as herein provided, and
if no definite date for any maturity be stated therein, then at the expiration of a like period from the date of the mortgage or of the extension, the lien of the mortgage shall cease and no suit or proceedings shall be begun thereafter to foreclose the mortgage.
(2) Such period shall be extended only by an extension of the
mortgage duly executed by the owner of the mortgaged premises and
recorded before the period of limitation expires, and shall not be extended by other agreement, non-residence, disability, partial payment
or otherwise.
(3) If an action or proceeding to foreclose has been begun before
the expiration of such period, it may be continued and completed
thereafter but it shall be void as to a person who in good faith becomes a purchaser or encumbrancer of the premises without actual
or constructive notice thereof.
(4) This section shall not apply to a mortgage in the form of an
absolute deed, unless such deed and the separate instrument operating
as a defeasance are both recorded at least one year prior to the time
when the period of limitation would expire if it applied."
Other existing statutes are as follows: Colorado, LAWS of 1933,
Ch. 155, p. 798; Idaho, 1932 CODE, §44-1102, §44-1103; Illinois, SMITHHURD ANN. STAT. Ch. 83, §llb; Indiana, ACTS of 1937, Ch. 97, p. 467:

Iowa, 1931 CODE, §11028; Kentucky, CARROLL'S KY. STAT. (1930),
§2514; Michigan, PUBLTC ACTS, 1929, Ch. 38, p. 71; North Carolina,
1939 CODE, §2594 (5) ; Ohio, OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, Lifetime Ed.),
§8546-2; Oregon. Comrp. LAWS ANN. (Bancroft, 1940), §68-111, §68-112,
§68-113; Virginia, ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, 1942, Ch. 331, p. 504.
It is thus seen that this problem has been the subject of considerable legislation, the majority of which, and on what Is believed to
be the sounder reasoning, follows a limitation theory.
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ferred to as a statute of limitations and the latter is often called
a recording statute.
Montana, being in a position of having a statute so ambiguous as to permit either construction, has the opportunity
to observe which type is the more effective and under which
the best results are achieved.
Construed as a recording statute, the only effect of Section
8267 would be to limit the period during which the record furnishes constructive notice of the rights of the mortgagee. The
effect of this is that anyone dealing with the property after
the expiration of eight years would have to avoid inquiring
into the question of whether the debt had been paid, if he
wished to be protected by Section 8267. However, construed as
a statute of limitation, the lien of a mortgage would expire in
eight years. It is safe to say that such a result was intended
by the legislature especially in view of the 1933 amendment
providing that a mortgage "shall be good as against all from
the time it is so recorded until eight years after the maturity
of the entire debt or obligation secured thereby and no longer,"
unless renewed. Further, if the words "no longer" mean anything, the legislature did not intend that exceptions should
be made for cases wherein appear facts outside the record such
as non-residence, part payment or acknowledgment of the debt.
In other words, the lien would be terminated absolutely in
eight years, if not renewed of record.
If we are to rid the records of stale mortgages, if we are
to preserve an up-to-date and informative record, it can best
be done by construing the statute as one of limitation, and include within it even the parties themselves. This result has been
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws' as the only effective method of clearing
the record and should be adopted in Montana to replace the
confusing and contradictory constructions now existing in the
decisions interpreting the statute, thus taking a step toward
the security and certainty of record titles.'
°See, Report of the Committee on a UNIFORm REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
Act, Handbook of 1927, p. 656 (§12).
slInteresting to note in connection with the legislative intent are the
comments made by the Hon. H. A. Simmons, Senator from Carbon
county and author of the 1933 amendments, made at that session of
the legislature. That statement, which Senator Simmons has been
kind enough to allow me to use, is as follows:
"The purpose of this bill when it was enacted in 1913 was to
enable a person to ascertain from the records in the office of the
county clerk whether a mortgage after the lapse of eight years
from its maturity (plus sixty days, the time given to renew it),
was still in existence.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/10

10

Erickson: Judicial History and Present Status of Section 8267, Montana Statutes

MORTGAGES

11

"Under the law as it existed prior to that time, no one could
tell whether a mortgage appearing on the records, not canceled,
was alive or not.
"The language of the statute contemplated that a mortgage
from the time recorded should be good 'until eight years after the
maturity of the entire debt or obligation secured thereby, and no
longer,' unless an affidavit be filed as provided by the statute. A
difficulty has arisen because of the inclusion in the Act of the
words, 'is thereby good and valid as against the creditors of the
mortgagor, or owner of the land mortgaged, or subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.' The inclusion of that sentence has made
the law obscure and difficult to construe. The decisions of the
Supreme Court, intended to interpret the law, have, in the opinion
of many lawyers cast further doubt upon its real intent and meaning.
"A person ought to be able to go to the office of the county
clerk and find out whether a mortgage eight years and sixty days
old is good and valid or not.
"The proposed bill will make the statute certain in its operation.
If the owner of a mortgage does not care enough about It to
file an affidavit of renewal at the end of eight years from its maturity, he ought to lose his len."
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